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A Door Ajar or a Floodgate?:
Corporate Liability After
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Tim Kline'
N 1i98o, the little known "Alien Tort Statute"' (ATS) caught the attention
lof human rights activists, governments, and corporations throughout the
world. Since then, numerous lawsuits have arisen under this statute, but
only recently has the Supreme Court weighed in on the provision, in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.3 After Sosa, few questions were answered, but many
more have been created. This note addresses these issues, and is divided
into five sections. First, it gives a brief history of the ATS and its use, in-
cluding the 198o Filartiga v. Pena-Irala4 case, which brought the ATS to
the attention of human rights advocates. Second, it reviews the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Sosa to determine what rules the Court promulgated
in determining when the statute applies. Third, it addresses the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS to determine if it can be used to hold cor-
porations liable for violations of international law. Fourth, the note surveys
several post-Sosa cases currently pending in the court system to determine
how Sosa has been applied in the lower federal courts. Finally, it predicts
how the ATS will be used against corporations in the future. For now, it suf-
fices to say that Sosa offers little to no protection for corporations that may
be accused of various customary international law or treaty violations, due
to the non-existent standard imposed by the Court in Sosa. This note will
demonstrate that Sosa is a paper-tiger ruling due to the increasing use of
the international law in non-ATS related cases and the evolving nature of
international law. Thus, corporations will likely be exposed to liability for
almost any imaginable tort in the future.
i J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law. I wish to thank my wife,
Elizabeth, and my parents, Ken and Vicki Kline, for their continued support and love.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (zooo). The statute reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Because "Alien Tort Statute" is how the Supreme
Court refers to this statute in Sosa, this note will use the same terminology.
3 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
4 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (zd Cir. 198o).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I. HISTORY AND EARLY USE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Judge Friendly once stated that the Alien Tort Statute is a "legal Lohen-
grin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act... no one
seems to know whence it came." The statute, drafted by Oliver Ellsworth,
was passed in the original Judiciary Act of 1789, but the lack of legislative
history makes it difficult to precisely define Congress' intent with its pas-
sage.6 Furthermore, the statute was seldom used before the Filartiga case,
leaving it shrouded in mystery until only the last twenty-five years. 7 In-
deed, the statute provided jurisdiction in only one case during the first 170
years of its existence.' Until only recently, the main question regarding the
ATS had not been answered: does it serve simply as a jurisdictional grant
or, does it provide "authority for the creation of a new cause of action for
torts in violation of international law"?9 To answer this question, it is help-
ful to review the ATS' history.
Two types of "laws of nations" existed at the time that the ATS was
originally written. The first involved general norms that governed the in-
teraction of states.'0 This aspect of international law was governed solely by
the executive and legislative branches." However, the second aspect of the
law of nations did involve the judicial branch. In volume four of his Com-
mentaries, Blackstone describes "Offences against the Law of Nations"
in some detail.-z Blackstone argued that this aspect of the law of nations
rested on natural law, based on a "system of rules, deducible by natural
reason and established byuniversal consent among the civilized inhabit-
ants of the world."' 3 At the time, Blackstone cited three types of principal
offences against the law of nations: violation of safe-conducts, infringement
of ambassadors' rights, and piracy.'4 Each of these offenses against the law
of nations could be and typically were violated by individuals.'5 Blackstone
5 1IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,519 F.d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
6 William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Oiginalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1996). The original wording of
the text stated: "That the district courts shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. at 225.
7 Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of International Labor
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529 (2002).
8 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
9 Id.
IO Id. at 714.
iI Id.
12 Dodge, supra note 6, at 225.
13 Id. at 225-26 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMErrARIS 66 (1775)).
14 Dodge, supra note 6, at 226.
15 Id.
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believed that such acts would more effectively be handled in the judicial
arena.' 6 Thus, Blackstone believed the government had both an interest
and duty in addressing these types of behaviors. 7 As the Sosa Court put it,
"[i]t was this narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a
judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in
international affairs, that was probably on minds of the men who drafted
the ATS with its reference to tort."' 8 In other words, the Founders likely
recognized that there were certain torts that affected not only the victims,
but rather, had far-reaching effects into the international political arena.' 9
Such actions would have to be redressed for the early republic to be recog-
nized by its peers in the international system.
The Continental Congress recognized the importance of addressing
this issue as early as 178I.20 Unfortunately, they had little power to handle
the issue themselves, and called on the States to "vindicate rights" un-
der the law of nations.2' Only Connecticut's legislature-including Oliver
Ellsworth, who would later draft the ATS--enacted such a statute, and the
Continental Congress maintained its impotence on the subject.22 During
the Constitutional Convention, the Founders made inroads by giving the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public ministers and Consuls," which addressed only one of the three
infractions described by Blackstone.2 3 The First Congress subsequently
added to the jurisdiction of federal courts over such matters as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, including Section 9, which was the first version of
the ATS.24 This Judiciary Act provided the federal courts with jurisdiction
over common-law crimes, which included crimes violating the laws of na-
tions.25 Did the ATS just provide jurisdiction to the courts, as the rest of
the Judiciary Act did, or, did it open up causes of action to wronged aliens?
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit became the first court to attempt to answer
that question.
After lying dormant for almost 200 years, the ATS was awoken by Dolly
Filartiga who filed a lawsuit under the ATS2 6 She claimed that the defen-
dant, Americo Pena-Irala, tortured and killed her brother, Joelito, in Para-
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
19 Id.
20 Dodge, supra note 6, at 226.
21 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 717.
24 Id. For a more thorough review of the history of the ATS, see Dodge, supra note 6, at
222-23.
25 Dodge, supra note 6, at 23 1.
26 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 Ezd 876, 876 (2d Cir. 198o).
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guay in retaliation for his father's political activities and beliefs.27 Claiming
jurisdiction under the ATS and citing the United Nations (U.N.) Charter,
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, The American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, and other international documents, Filartiga
attempted to establish that Joelito's death violated customary international
law.2R Because the claim did not arise directly under a treaty, the court grap-
pled with the issue of whether this conduct violated the law of nations.29
Claiming that torture is universally condemned in numerous international
agreements, and that almost all nations had renounced torture as an official
policy, the court held that "an act of torture committed by a state official
against one held in detention violates established norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights, and hence the law of nations," and therefore the
plaintiffs had a cause of action under the ATS.30
As alluded to in the previous statement, the Court looked to numer-
ous instruments in determining what violates the law of nations. Citing
the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit stated: "the law of nations 'may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."'P' Furthermore, the court concluded
that the law of nations was not static by specifying that "courts must inter-
pret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today."32 The court did attempt to limit
itself in its interpretation of the ATS, however. While Filartiga urged the
court to treat the ATS as an exercise of Congress' power to define offenses
against the law of nations, the court held that the ATS did not grant new
rights to aliens, but rather, opened the federal courts for adjudication of
already recognized international law. 33 Thus, the Filartiga court stated that
if the defendant's alleged conduct violated "well-established, universally
27 Id. at 878.
28 Id. at 879. For the purposes of this note, "customary international law" is defined
in terms used by the Sosa court: any international law "rest[ing] on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
29 See Filartiga, 630 F.zd at 88o-81.
30 Id. at 88o.
31 Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, i6o-6i (1820)).
32 Id. at 881. The court specifically referenced The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694
(i9oo), in coming to this conclusion. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the
"traditional prohibition against seizure of an enemy's coastal fishing vessels during wartime,
a standard that began as one of comity only, had ripened over the preceding century into 'a
settled rule of international law' by 'the general assent of civilized nations."'
33 See Filartiga, 630 Ezd at 887.
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recognized norms of international law"- rather than "idiosyncratic legal
rules," 3s federal jurisdiction was present under the ATS.
This first trickle opened the floodgates of ATS-related suits. In Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic,36 representatives of individuals killed in a bus at-
tack in Israel sued Libya, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and oth-
er defendants. 37 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals proved more restrained,
however, agreeing unanimously that it had no jurisdiction over the claims,
although each judge wrote a separate concurring opinion.3' The reasons
can be summed up as follows: (i) only a handful of heinous actions which
violate definable universal and obligatory norms should fall under the ATS;
(2) exercising jurisdiction improperly places the judiciary in a realm re-
served for the executive and legislative branches; and (3) the ATS merely
provided jurisdiction and did not provide for private causes of action for
international law violations. 39
The Second Circuit proved friendlier to the ATS cases however, fol-
lowing their own lead in Filartiga. The atrocities visited upon Croat and
Muslim citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a significant expansion in
how the court viewed ATS jurisdiction. In Kadic v. Karadzic,40 the plain-
tiff alleged that Serb General Radovan Karadzic "personally planned and
ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms
of torture designed to destroy the religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats." 4' Citing genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity as meeting the requirement for jurisdiction under the
ATS, the court held that Karazdic could be held liable in his private capac-
ity,42 thereby broadening the reach of the ATS from state to private actors.
Several other cases followed in this fashion, both within the Second Circuit
and its sister circuits.43
34 Id. at 888.
35 Id. at 88 i.
36 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
37 Id. at 775.
38 See Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of
the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law
Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 103, 112 (20O5).
39 Id. at I 13-14.
40 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (I996).
41 Id. at 242.
42 Id. at 236.
43 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996) (ATS "establishes
a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to
violations of customary international law"); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cit.
1996) (reestablishing the rule that violations of international law under the ATS are actionable
if they are derived from specific, universal and obligatory norms); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 88o (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part & rev'dinpart, 395 F3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (maintain-
ing jurisdiction under the ATS regarding American oil company's involvement with Burmese
2oo5-2oo6]
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These suits paved the way for an onslaught of suits against multinational
corporations, most of which failed.- In 1997, Doe I v. Unocal Corp5 changed
this trend. A federal district court in California found subject matter juris-
diction under the ATS "based on allegations that an American oil company,
acting allegedly in concert with the Myanmar/Burmese government, com-
mitted various civil and human rights abuses." 46 In a subsequent appeal,
the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's allegations could be substantiated
by the evidence--one could reasonably find that Unocal aided and abetted
in forced labor, rape, murder, and torture by the Burmese government. 47
At trial, the court broadly viewed international law, citing several conven-
tions and other international instruments to which the United States is not
a party.48 Furthermore, it appears that the court held international law in
higher esteem than American state or federal law, thus creating a broad
reach for the ATS.a9 The most sweeping result of this case, therefore, was
that corporations may be held liable for human rights violations under cus-
tomary international law.so
Subsequent cases have been brought against numerous corporations,
including Chevron, Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, and The Gap, among others.5
These cases involved vicarious liability, direct liability, and aiding and abet-
ting, and are attractive to plaintiffs because of deep corporate pockets.52
However, none of these cases reached the Supreme Court.
II. SosA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN: THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN
As mentioned, all of the above cases were pre-Sosa, and the United States
Supreme Court had yet not weighed in on the ATS. The following is a re-
view of the facts and law from Sosa, which will be useful in the later discus-
sion on corporate liability after Sosa.
In 1985, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent was cap-
tured while in Mexico, taken to a house in Guadalajara, tortured for two
days, and subsequently murdered.5 3 After interviewing eyewitnesses, the
government in human and civil rights abuses).
44 Kochan, supra note 38, at 116.
45 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 88o (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part &rev'd in part,
395 F3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
46 Kochan, supra note 38, at 116.
47 Id. (citing Doe 1, 395 E3d at 954-55).
48 Id.
49 Id.
5o Id. at 117.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
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DEA concluded that Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican
doctor, was present for the agent's torture and murder and in fact helped
draw out the agent's life to extend the torture and interrogation.s4 For his
role in the torture and murder of the DEA agent, a grand jury indicted
Alvarez, and the District Court for the Central District of California issued
an arrest warrant.55 After the Mexican government refused to extradite Al-
varez to the United States, the DEA hired Mexican nationals to capture
Alvarez and bring him into the United States to stand trial.56 The hired
group of Mexicans, including Sosa, kidnapped Alvarez, held him in a motel
overnight, and then flew him by private plane to the El Paso, Texas, where
he was arrested on arrival.57 Claiming that his seizure was "outrageous gov-
ernmental conduct" and that it violated the extradition treaty between
Mexico and the United States, Alvarez moved for dismissal of his indict-
ment.58 While the District Court and Ninth Circuit agreed with Alvarez, the
United States Supreme Court held that the method used to bring Alvarez
within the court's jurisdiction had no effect on federal court's jurisdiction
over the matter.59 Alvarez was later acquitted after the presentation of the
Government's case.6°
After returning to Mexico in 1993, Alvarez filed a civil suit against nu-
merous parties who participated in his abduction, including Sosa, a DEA
operative, five Mexican civilians, the United States, and five DEA agents. 6'
Alvarez based his damage claim against the United States on the Federal
Tort Claims Act6Z (FTCA) and against Sosa based on the ATS, claiming
Sosa violated the law of nations in kidnapping him.63 The District Court
dismissed the FTCA claim but awarded summary judgment and monetary
damages to Alvarez on his ATS claim, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.64
The Ninth Circuit then heard the case en banc, affirming the panel's ruling,
stating that the ATS "not only provides federal courts with subject matter
jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the
law of nations." 65 Referring to the "clear and universally recognized norm
prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention," the Court said that Alvarez's ar-
54 Id.
55 Id. at 697-98.
56 Id. at 698.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6o Id.
61 Id.
62 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(I), 2761 et seq. (zooo)
63 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
64 Id. at 699.
65 Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F3d 6o4,641 (9th Cir. 2003)).
2oo5-2oo6]
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rest was in fact a tort in violation of the law of nations.66 Sosa then appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Sosa argued that the ATS provided no relief because the statute merely
gave federal courts jurisdiction and did not authorize the courts to recog-
nize any cause of action without congressional action to the contrary.67 The
Court ruled differently, stating that although the statute was jurisdictional
in nature, at the time it was enacted, the ATS provided the newly created
federal courts the power to hear a limited category of claims "defined by
the law of nations and recognized at common law."6 It did not believe,
however, that the "limited, implicit sanction to entertain the handful of
international law [with] common law claims understood in 1789 should
be taken as authority to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez
here."69
The Court provided many reasons for its ruling. First, because the ATS
was placed in the Judiciary Act, which otherwise dealt only with federal-
court jurisdiction, it was also jurisdictional in nature.70 This holding raised
the question of whether the ATS was stillborn at the time of its passage.
Citing "amici professors," the court stated that "federal courts could enter-
tain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in
violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the com-
mon law of the time."71 They then expounded upon the history of the ATS,
asserting that the Founders must have intended that the statute have some
bite, otherwise, the issue of an individual's violation of the law of nations
could not be addressed. 72 Thus, the Court held:
[Tihe First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to
be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that
might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide
to make some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of
foreigners.73
Furthermore, the First Congress intended that the ATS provide jurisdic-
tion for the short list of actions involving individual violations of the law
of nations. 74 At the time the ATS was enacted, the common law recognized
only three such violations, i.e. piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offens-
66 Id.
67 Id. at 712.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 713.
71 Id. at 714.
72 Id. at 724.
73 Id. at 719.
74 Id. at 720.
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es against ambassadors, which are described above.75 Summing up their
historical review of the ATS, the Court stated:
[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac-
tion, the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the stat-
ute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law. The
jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understand-
ing that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability
at the time7
6
The Court then turned to how the ATS should be applied today. First,
it assumed that Congress had taken no action after the ATS' enactment to
preclude federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations
as a common law element. 77 Neither had Congress amended the ATS or
limited the civil common law by some other statute.7S The Court did see a
need for judicial caution when determining what types of claims might fall
under the ATS.79 Building upon these premises, the Court concluded that a
claim today must "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized." 8
Realizing that this holding was not the type of black-letter law upon
which a district court could confidently depend, the court specified several
reasons for judicial caution when considering claims that might fall under
the ATS. First, the notion of what is part of the common law has changed
dramatically since the ATS was created in 1789.81 Second, the role of federal
courts in creating common law has changed. Rather than developing com-
mon law based on their own authority, courts must now look to legislative
guidance before exercising judicial authority over substantive law.82 Third,
the Court believed that the creation of private rights of action is better left
to the legislative branch in most cases. 3 Fourth, courts must be wary of the
implications for U.S. foreign relations in recognizing new causes of action.84
75 Id.
76 Id. at 724.
77 Id. at 724-25.
78 Id. at 725.
79 Id.
8o Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 726.
83 Id. at 727.
84 Id. at 727-28. ("Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the viola-
tion of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequenc-
es, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution.") (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774,813 (1984) (Bork, J. concurring)).
2005- 2oo6 ]
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Fifth, courts have "no congressional mandate to seek out and define new
and debatable violations of the law of nations."
s
With these cautions and the underlying belief that the statute is ju-
risdictional, the Court turned to deriving a set of standards for reviewing
Alvarez's claim. First, "federal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted."86 In making
this determination, courts must exercise judgment regarding "the practi-
cal consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal
courts."'s One practical consequence is how the action might affect the
political branches, which will vary with the facts of each case. s8 Addition-
ally, a claim "must be gauged against the current state of international law,
looking to those sources [that the Court has] long, albeit cautiously, rec-
ognized."8 9 Applying these principles to Alvarez's circumstances, the court
held that he did not have a valid ATS claim. 90 Alvarez's theory, they stated,
was too broad, and its "aspiration ... exceed [ed] any binding customary rule
having the specificity [the Court] require[d]"9' since following Alvarez's
desire to create such a private cause of action would surpass any post-Erie
common law discretion that the federal courts retain.92 In summary, the
court said it was sufficient to hold that a "single illegal detention of less
than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a
prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so
well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."
93
85 Id. at 728.
86 Id. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (8zo)).
87 Id. at 732-33.
88 Id. at 733. (In cases with political implications, "there is a strong argument that federal
courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on
foreign policy.").
89 Id. In elaborating on the sources upon which courts should rely upon when determining
the current state of international law, the Court stated:
[Wihere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Id. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 0900)).
90 Id. at 738.
9 1 Id.
92 Id. at 729-30, 738.
93 Id. at 738.
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This formulation of how to apply the ATS is rife with confusion. On
one hand, the Court held that the statute was jurisdictional only, but within
the same paragraph, they held that there are common law causes of ac-
tion within the statute. 94 Cautionary discretion is advised of the district
courts who will apply the holding,95 but the limitation is open-ended given
that each claim is measured against the current state of international law,96
which may change over time. This confusion was captured in a Wall Street
Journal article written at the time of Sosa's opinion.97 Outside Counsel for
Unocal said that the decision represented a "sound rejection" of the way
that human-rights groups were using the ATS.9s On the other hand, a rep-
resentative of the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York thought
"that business' and government's effort to :eliminate the statute as a basis
for relief was defeated." 99 What is clear, however, is that any.determina-
tion is inherently fact-intensive, which undoubtedly presents difficulties
for courts attempting to apply it.' °
III. CORPORATE LIABILITY POST-SOSA
As already discussed, the ATS was used multiple times in an attempt to
hold corporations liable for actions in foreign countries prior to Sosa.101 Will
Sosa end these attempts? Before discussing what may be viewed as a bind-
ing customary rule, the question of whether corporations can be held liable
under the ATS must be answered. This question is important because the
prospect of large judgments or settlements can drive litigation, and plain-
tiffs' attorneys will rush to use this statute to reach the pockets of corpora-
tions.'0 2 Already, evidence exists that some corporations have settled cases
due to the unpredictability of this new theory of action under the ATS.'0 3
94 Id. at 712.
95 Id. at 725 .
96 Id. at 734.
97 Robert S. Greenberger & Pui-Wing Tam, Supreme Court Limits Foreigners' Ability to Act,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at A3.
98 Id.
99 Id.
ioo For example, the Court held that Alvarez's detention did not reach the type of ar-
bitrary detention which falls under the ATS because it was only one day. Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). Using the Court's determination as a guide for other cases,
it is reasonable to conclude that this lack of a bright-line test will give federal judges broad
discretion in determining when the line is crossed. This query is likely to be heavily fact-in-
tensive, having little basis in any legal foundation.
io Kochan, supra note 38, at 116.
102 Id. at 117.
103 Id. at 117-18.
2oo5-2oo6]
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To answer this question, Sosa must be considered, but unfortunately, it
says very little. In fact, only one footnote directly addresses the subject:
A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual. Compare Tel-
Oren ... (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates
international law) with Kadic... (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide
by private actors violates international law.)0 4
The Court may have raised the issue for the benefit of the lower courts as a
consideration they will have to make in adjudicating such cases. However,
for the present, circuit court rulings are most relevant, particularly because
the Court explicitly referred to them in Sosa.105 Therefore, further discus-
sion is limited to cases that are within the D.C. and Second Circuits (since
these circuits were specially mentioned by the Sosa Court) and to cases
that have either been decided since Sosa or are currently before courts.
The D.C. Circuit has strictly construed the ATS, holding that the law
of nations does not apply to private actors.'16 Ibrahim involved seven Iraqi
nationals who sued Titan Corporation (Titan), a private government con-
tractor, among others, for its role in the activities at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq.107 The plaintiffs alleged serious violations, namely that the defendant
tortured one or more through various means, including beating them, sub-
jecting them to loud, excessive noise for long periods of time, threatening
dog attacks, urinating on them, and forcing them to witness abuse of other
prisoners.1,8
In accordance with Sosa, the court recognized that claims cognizable
under the jurisdictional grant of the ATS are not limited to those that vio-
lated the law of nations at the time of its enactment. New claims based
on "common law principles ... [that] 'rest[ed] on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recog-
nized,"' could be recognized under the jurisdiction of the ATS.' °9 However,
while the court did find that the allegations were against the law of nations,
it also found that the law of nations did not apply to private actors, such as
Titan.'°
104 Sosa, U.S. at 733 n.2o.
105 See infra notes io6-22.
io6 Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 E Supp. 2d io (D.D.C. 2005).
107 Id. at iz.
io8 Id.
io9 Id. at 13 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725).
iio Id. at 14. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether the law of nations could be applied against private actors.
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Citing Tel-Oren, the court recounted the three separate opinions of the
judges on the panel."' Looking to Judge Edwards, who read the ATS the
most broadly among the three judges, the court found "no consensus that
private actors are bound by the law of nations." ...
The court also looked to the D.C. Circuit case of Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan,' 3 which involved allegations of "execution, murder, abduction, tor-
ture, rape, wounding, and the destruction of private property and public fa-
cilities" by the Contras in Nicaragua." 4 Quoting Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren,
the Sanchez Court held that "the law of nations 'does not reach private,
non-state conduct of this sort.""' Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
for the ATS to apply to a private actor, the plaintiff's allegations must be
a violation of international law and the law of nations must at some point
recognize private actor liability."6
In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that private actors may be liable for
violations of the law of nations."7 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Liti-
iii Id.
I 12 Id. (citing Tel-Oren, 726 E2d at 791-95) (Edwards, J., concurring)),
113 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.d 202 (1985).
114 Id. at 205 (quoting Plaintiff's complaint).
115 Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F Supp. 2d IO, 14 (D.D.C. 2005);see also id. at 15. (Judge
Edwards "found on consensus that private actors are bound by the law of nations."). In Tel-
Oren, Judge Edwards foresaw a slippery slope if the law of nations were applied to private
actors.
The extension would require this court to venture out of the comfort-
able realm of established international law-within which Filartiga firm-
ly sat-in which states are the actors. It would require an assessment of
tlie extent to which international law imposes not only rights but also
obligations on individuals. It would require a determination of where to
draw a line between persons or groups who are or are not bound by dic-
tates of international law, and what the groups look like. Would terrorists
be liable, because numerous international documents recognize their
existence and proscribe their acts? ... Would all organized political enti-
ties be obliged to abide by the law of nations? Would everybody be liable?
As firmly established as is the core principle binding states to customary
international obligations, these fringe areas are only gradually emerging
and offer, as of now, no obvious stopping point. Therefore, heeding the
warning of the Supreme Court in Sabbaino, to wit, "the greater the de-
gree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of interna-
tional law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it," 376 U.S. at 428, 1 am not prepared to extend the definition
of the "law of nations" absent direction from the Supreme Court. The
degree of "codification or consensus" is simply too slight.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C.
2005) ("Grafting § 1983 color of law analysis onto international law claims would be an end-
run around the accepted principle that most violations of international law can be committed
only by states.").
i 16 Ibrahim, 391 F Supp. 2d at 14.
117 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe reach of international law
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gation"5 reinforced this notion by referring to a litany of cases in the Second
Circuit which allowed invocation of the ATS against private actors. ' 9 Ad-
ditionally, the court looked back to one of the earliest commentaries on the
ATS, made by Attorney General Bradford, to show that liability of private
actors for violations of international law was understood at the enactment
of the ATS.12o When asked to determine what might be done to punish
Americans involved in the French plunder of Sierra Leone, Bradford stated
that those injured could file a civil suit in federal court, "jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort
only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States." 12.
Thus, according to Bradford, individuals would be liable under the ATS for
"committing, aiding, or abetting" violations of the laws of war.'22 Thus, at
least in the Second Circuit, private actors may be held liable for violations
of the law of nations.
Whether the ATS allows plaintiffs to sue private actors could very well
be the next major ATS issue for the Supreme Court to address. With a split
in the circuits,23 a plaintiff can simply shop around for a court that will
allow a claim under the ATS to proceed against a private entity. Because
these cases deal mostly with large, profitable multinational corporations, es-
tablishing sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction is unlikely
to be an issue.' 4 On the other hand, the fact that the Sosa Court left the
door open as to what is encompassed by the law of nations will probably
mean that as more corporations are sued for international law violations,
*the practice of holding them liable may reach the normalcy, definitiveness,
and acceptance required to make private actor liability part of the law of
nations. 125 The next section examines what issues are making their way
through the lower federal courts.
is not limited to... state actors.").
118 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y zoo5).
i 19 Id. at 52-53.
12o Id.
121 Dodge, supra note 6, at 253 (quoting Breach of Neutrality, i Op. Att'y Gen., 57, 59
(1795)).
122 "Agent Orange," 373 F Supp. 2d at 54.
123 Compare Ibrahim, 391 E Supp. 2d at 1 o, with "Agent Orange," 373 E Supp. 2d at 7.
124 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316-18 (1945).
125 This inference is drawn based on the trend already demonstrated. When the ATS
was created in 1789, it entailed merely three torts. Today, many more torts are widely accepted
as falling under the purview of the ATS. Given the open door maintained by the high court in
Sosa, it is probable that the definition of the law of nations will expand.
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IV. ATS's GATEKEEPERS: A SURVEY OF POST-SOSA CASES IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Since Sosa, the federal district and appellate courts have had the opportu-
nity to review cases involving these issues. In order to determine how the
law in this area is progressing, this section presents a brief survey of some
of the major cases percolating in the Circuits.
A. Second Circuit
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,126 the plaintiffs were
a church and group of citizens who resided in the southern Sudan near
several oilfields developed by the defendant oil company, Talisman. 27 The
plaintiffs alleged that their churches were destroyed and that church lead-
ers and members were killed, raped, enslaved, tortured, and displaced by
the Sudanese military because of their ethnicity and proximity to the oil-
fields. 128 They argued that Talisman was involved in these actions because
of its relationship with the Sudanese government, whereby Sudan received
39% of all oil revenues from Talisman's operations in southern Sudan.29
In 1989, a military coup ousted the Khartoum government paving the
way for an Islamo-fascist group, the National Islamic Front, to take con-
trol. '30 Since then, the Sudanese government has "intensified the religious
and ethnic persecution" against non-Muslims in southern and western
Sudan.'3' This conflict escalated to an "oil war" for control of Sudan's oil
supply.'32 The plaintiffs claimed that a "symbiotic partnership" formed be-
tween foreign oil companies, such as Talisman, and the Government:
[T]he Government could only receive capital from the development of its
oil reserves to expand its war against the southern population by turning to
foreign oil companies with the technology to develop the reserves success-
fully, while foreign oil companies could only develop the oil reserves suc-
cessfully under secure conditions generated by assisting the Government in
waging war against its southern population. 133
126 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 226 ER.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
127 Id. at 457-58.
Iz8 Id. at 458.
129 Id. at 461.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 462.
133 Id.
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Plaintiffs argued that Talisman knew of the link between its prede-
cessor company in Sudan and the Government and that the predecessor
employed private and government forces to protect its operations. 34 The
plaintiffs further alleged that Talisman itself maintained the Government's
military vehicles and even supplied the military bases in exchange for
protection. 3s Finally, plaintiffs claimed that Talisman worked with the
Sudanese government to "dispose of" civilians living in areas that Talis-
man wished to explore, and that these actions, including murder, rape, and
torture of ethnic and religious minorities, amounted to genocide and war
crimes against the local population.'36 While the court ultimately declined
to certify the class of plaintiffs in the case, it accepted that genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity all fall under the ATS.'37
As already mentioned, the ATS encompasses corporate liability in the
Second Circuit, but the Talisman litigation provides more insight into the is-
sue. First, the court stated that the Supreme Court, though given ample op-
portunity to disallow ATS cases with corporate defendants, has failed to do
so.'13 Additionally, while governments have objected to their corporations
being subject to litigation under the ATS, the objections are not because
of a belief that there is no violation of international law when a corporation
commits (or aids in committing) genocide or other similar crimes.' 39 Talis-
man provides good insight into direct and indirect liability for corporate
defendants under the ATS.
In Weiss v. American Jewish Committee,140 the plaintiffs, descendants of
Jews killed at the Belzec concentration camp in Poland, sued under the
ATS to stop the defendant Jewish organization from continuing to fund
the construction of a trench at the site, which was part of a larger Holocaust
memorial.'1' Weiss contended that digging at the site would constitute a
violation of Jewish ceremonial law concerning human remains, and sued to
enjoin further digging. 141 Plaintiffs sought to meet the ATS' requirements
by alleging that further digging violated the law of nations as expounded
by the "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August [949"
134 Id. at 463.
135 Id. at 464.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 485. The court denied certification because "the core question ... is whether
the suffering endured by each putative class member can be attributed to the defendant [and]
[tihat is fundamentally an individual question." Id.
138 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18140
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
139 Id. at " 1.
140 Weiss v. American Jewish Comm., 335 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
141 Id. at 470.
142 Id. at 470, 473.
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(Protocol), the "Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts," and
the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCPR).'43
The Court analyzed these documents and concluded that while they
were evidence of customary international law in that they create legal obli-
gations among signatories, the plaintiff failed to show that an "overwhelm-
ing majority of States have ratified [them and that] those States uniformly
and consistently act in accordance with [their] principles." '44 Additionally,
while the Protocol states that the remains of those who died as a result
of hostilities should be respected, the court did not find this principle to
be uniformly observed so as to recognize a binding customary law obliga-
tion.145 Finally, as to the ICCPR, the court said that nothing in it regarding
arbitrary or unlawful interference with an individual's privacy or family was
sufficient to give rise to a rule of customary international law.'46
These cases shed light on the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
ATS, post-Sosa. While denying customary international law status to pos-
sible grave desecration, the Second Circuit has determined that genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity do fit the requirements for Sosa
liability. Additionally, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed its belief that cor-
porations may be called to task under the ATS for customary international
law violations.
B. Third Circuit
Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service'47 involves Jama
and several other plaintiffs who were foreign nationals and refugees seek-
ing political asylum in the United States.' 48 After being taken into custo-
dy by the INS for being illegal aliens, the plaintiffs were transported to a
holding facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey.'49 Esmor, a corporate defendant,
managed and operated the for-profit facility for federal, state and local agen-
cies. 150 In 1995, the detainees rioted, causing the facility to close, and the
detainees were deported or transferred elsewhere.'1' Plaintiffs claimed that
while there were held at the Elizabeth facility, they were tortured, beaten,
143 Id. at 476.
144 Id. (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 E3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (The law
of nations "is composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out
of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern)).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 343 F Supp. 2d 338
(D.N.J. 2004).
148 Id. at 345.
149 Id. at 345-46.
150 Id. at 346.
151 Id.
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harassed, mistreated by the Esmor guards and subjected to horrid living
conditions, including poor sanitation and insufficient medical treatment.5 2
Plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court under the ATS and other
laws. To establish that customary international norms had been violated,
the plaintiffs based the their claims on nineteen international agreements,
including treaties, human rights charters, and other conventions dealing
with refugees' rights, to establish that customary international norms ap-
plied.'53 After Sosa, the court had to readdress each of these issues.'54 First,
the court determined that the claims against Esmor's guards did not meet
the "rigorous Sosa requirements" because they did not rise to the level
of torture and murder which was the subject of Filartiga.55 For example,
the court cited that sexual harassment and assault did not rise to the level
of a violation of the law of nations.' s6 However, the court did determine
that Esmor could be liable for the alleged actions of the guards because
respondeat superior was'applicable.5 7 Furthermore, the court concluded
that Esmor's "inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of
no crime and held in confinement is a violation of the law of nations."'s8 In
other words, while none of the defendants' individual actions violated the
ATS, the totality of such actions could violate the ATS.'19
This case is interesting in that the court did not hinge liability on a sin-
gle event, but on the totality of Esmor's actions against a large number of
non-criminal detainees.'60 Additionally, it is a prime example of the District
Court's role as the gatekeeper post-Sosa, reflecting the court's interpreta-
tion of Sosa.
C. Ninth Circuit
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,'6' involved an American company, Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation, which operated a pipeline in Santo Domin-
go, Colombia. 62 AirScan, another defendant in the case, provided security
for Occidental's pipeline from insurgents, who regularly attacked Occiden-
152 Id.
153 Id. at 358.
154 Id. at 357. Because the Sosa opinion was issued in June 2004, the Jama court de-
termined that the rulings in its 1998 Opinion concerning the ATS were outdated. See id. at
357-66.
155 Id. at 36o-6i.
i56 Id. at 383.
157 Id. at 361.
158 Id.
159 Id
i6o Id. at 36o.
161 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. zoo5).
162 Id. ati 168.
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tal's commercial interests.'6 3 To protect its interests, Occidental also pro-
vided financial and other assistance to the Colombian military, including
allowing them to plan missions in Occidental facilities.' 64 At Occidental's
behest, AirScan, along with Colombian military liaisons, used aircraft to
provide surveillance for the Colombian Air Force (CAF), which was then
used by the CAF to find targets and deploy troops in their ongoing struggle
against the insurgents.
I65
On December 13, 1998, CAF helicopters dropped cluster bombs on the
town of Santo Domingo with the purpose of protecting Occidental's pipe-
line from attack by insurgents.'" The bombs destroyed several homes and
killed seventeen civilians, including six children, while wounding twenty-
five others.' 67 According to the plaintiffs, no insurgents were killed in the
attack.' 6 The plaintiffs alleged that Occidental and the other defendants
knew that there were no insurgents in the area, yet persisted in the at-
tack. '69 The plaintiffs filed suit and based part of their claims on the ATS
alleging "extra-judicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment, and war crimes."' 170
It is important to recognize that because the court did not dismiss the
case at the outset, the clear inference is that the court believes that cor-
porations may be sued under the ATS.'1' As to extra-judicial killing, the
court held that binding customary international law norms exist, and were
not supplanted by the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),'72 which also
includes a right of action against such behavior.' 73 Citing several previous
cases, the court suggested that murder is ajus cogens violation, and as such,
is a violation of the laws of nations.'74
Relying on the fact that Congress had passed the TVPA, the court found
this to be "strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a bind-
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
68 Id.
169 Id. at 1168-69.
170 Id. at 176.
171 Id. This assumption is made based on the fact that while the court ultimately
dismissed the ATS claim on other grounds, it did not even address the issue of corporate
liability under the ATS.
172 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
173 "The Court does not believe that the TVPA precludes claims of torture and extra-
judicial killing under the ATS." Id. at 1179 n.13.
174 Id. (citing Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), vacatedandreh'g
en banc, 395 F3d 978 (2003)).
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ing customary international law norm."'' 75 Probably most interestingly, the
court relied on the Nuremberg Charter and its prohibitions against crimes
against humanity to determine that crimes against humanity are prohibited
by the law of nations.' 76 The intriguing part of this determination lies in
how the court arrived at this conclusion. Citing Sosa, the court stated that
it could consider opinions of experts in the field to determine what is an
international law norm.' 77 The plaintiffs provided a declaration from a pro-
fessor of international human rights and international environmental law,
and apparently, the court found this to be compelling.'78 Relying on the fact
that the Nuremburg trials and subsequent international criminal tribunals
have prosecuted and enforced norms for crimes against humanity, the court
determined that war crimes and crimes against humanity were binding in-
ternational law norms.'
79
As to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the court looked to in-
ternational criminal tribunals again, this time in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
as well as some previous court cases.'" Finally, the Geneva Conventions,
ratified by over i8o countries, and the War Crimes Act of 1996 provided the
court with enough evidence to decide that war crimes are prohibited by the
law of nations.'"' Thus, the court found every claim under the ATS to meet
the test of Sosa, although it later ruled that the claims for cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment to be unnecessarily duplicative, given the plain-
tiffs' abilities to-sue forintentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 While
each of these claims did fall under the ATS, the court ultimately dismissed
because of the political question doctrine.'
s3
Even though ultimately dismissed, the Ninth Circuit, via Occidental,
clearly applies a liberal interpretation to the ATS and Sosa's rubric for its
application.
D. Eleventh Circuit
In Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,' 84 Guatemalan plaintiffs, mem-
bers of a trade union, alleged that while they were trying to negotiate a
new collective bargaining agreement with a Del Monte subsidiary, the sub-
sidiary hired a private, armed security force which was used to intimidate
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at n.14.
178 Id.
179 Id. at i i8o.
18o Id. at 1181.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1182.
183 Id. at 1195.
184 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F3d 1242 (1 ith Cir. 2005).
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and threaten the trade union.'18 According to plaintiffs, the security force
threatened violence if the plaintiffs did not give in to the Del Monte sub-
sidiary's position to denounce the trade union involved in negotiations.'
86
Additionally, defendants threatened to kill the plaintiffs if they did not
leave Guatemala.'8 7 Plaintiffs filed suit alleging several claims under the
ATS.
Based on its interpretation of Sosa, the Court of Appeals saw no basis
for recognizing plaintiffs' claims for cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment.'" While district courts in the Eleventh Circuit had recognized
such a cause of action under the ATS, the appellate court stated that such
claims arose under the ICCPR, and that this covenant does not create ob-
ligations which a federal court can enforce.' 89 The court similarly disposed
of plaintiffs' arbitrary detention claim because the plaintiffs were detained
for a short period of time.'90 Furthermore, the Court affirmed dismissal of
plaintiffs' crimes against humanity claim.' 9' Although the court recognized
such crimes as violations of international law, the court found that the plain-
tiffs failed to plead the necessary element that the crimes "occur as a result
of 'widespread or systematic attack' against civilian populations." 192 Thus,
while this claim was dismissed, the court clearly viewed it as falling under
the purview of the ATS.
Plaintiffs also brought torture claims against Del Monte.93 Most rel-
evant from this portion of the court's ruling is that a claim for state-spon-
sored torture can be based on both direct and indirect liability under the
ATS.'94 The court concluded that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to show
torture causing mental distress under the ATS.'gs Looking to the "Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment," the court found that the claims alleged by the plaintiffs
could constitute torture-based on intentionally inflicted emotional pain
and suffering,9 6 but plaintiffs' claims of internationally inflicted physical
pain and suffering the situation did not rise to torture. I97
185 Id. at 1245.
186 Id.
187 Id.
i88 Id. at 1247.
189 Id.
19o Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. (quoting Cabello v. Fernandez-Larious, 402 F3d 1148, 116i (I ith Cir. 2005).
193 Id. at 1247-48.
194 Id. at 1248 ("The Alien Tort Act 'reaches conspiracies and accomplice liability....")
(quoting Cabello, 402 F3d at 1157).
195 Id. at 1251.
196 Id. at 1252-53.
197 Id. at 1253.
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Thus, it appears that the Aldana court widened the notion of torture to
encompass not only physical, but also mental distress, the opposite of the
ruling reached in Mujica. With this background, we now discuss the impli-
cations of Sosa and the future of litigation under the ATS.1gs
V. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
Now that the ATS, Sosa, and several post-Sosa cases have been discussed,
the question becomes: now what? This section will address several of the
author's observations with regard to the way the law may evolve.
First, as the Sosa court was ambiguous on whether corporations or other
third parties may be held liable under the ATS, the issue has yet to be fully
decided.' 99 Courts within the D.C. Circuit say no,2° but courts within other
circuits disagree. 20 ' One might have expected this issue to have already
reached the Supreme Court, given the number of ATS-related suits against
corporations since 198o, but the issue has yet to be addressed. However,
while the Circuits are divided, plaintiffs will be able to shop for a forum
that will hold their prospective defendant to be a proper party to such a
suit. At some point, the high court will need to step in to ensure that the
ATS is applied consistently throughout the Circuits.
Second, as described in detail above, cases brought against corpora-
tions under the ATS have been allowed for extra-judicial killing, mental
and physical torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, inhuman, cruel
and degrading treatment, and confinement of large groups under generally
horrendous conditions. Courts have not found ATS jurisdiction for non-
widespread sexual harassment, simple assault, disruption of gravesites,
business relations with apartheid-style regimes, and medical testing with-
out consent.
202
There is good reason to believe that the list of offenses for which ju-
risdiction may be found under the ATS will grow. The Sosa court stated
the requirements for determining what offenses may be found in the ATS:
"federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common
198 For more post-Sosa cases, see, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161z6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (failing to get informed consent before performing medical experi-
ments on children in Nigeria not contemplated by ATS); Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (aiding and abetting not actionable under the ATS; sexual violence
is not a "specific, universal, and obligatory" norm under the ATS); S. African Apartheid Lit. v.
Citigroup, Inc., 346 F Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (failing to recognize aider/abettor liability
under the ATS for doing business in the apartheid regime of South Africa).
199 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
zoo See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. zd io, io (D.D.C. 2005).
201 See, e.g., In ra "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 373 E Supp. zd 7 (E.D.N.Y. zoo5).
202 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms fa-
miliar when [the ATS] was enacted. '20 3 Courts must use their judgment
regarding the "practical consequences of making that cause available to
litigants in the federal courts.' ' 204 Finally, a claim "must be gauged against
the current state of international law, looking to those sources [the court
has] long, albeit cautiously, recognized."205
While this appears to be a black-letter, bright-line test, it is clearly more
than a "door ajar." Internationally-agreed-upon norms change with time.
The most obvious example is slavery, which was a widely practiced institu-
tion for centuries but is no longer recognized in most nations. o6 Thus, as
these norms change, district courts will be forced to rely upon what the
world agrees to be right or wrong, and such discretion is broad, rather than
a narrow "gate-keeping" power. In practical terms, this means that within
the near future, corporations may be sued under the ATS for any or all of
the offenses listed above that currently are not found to provide jurisdic-
tion under the ATS. In addition, environmental groups will surely use the
evolving importance of agreements such as the Kyoto Protocols to push
their policies in American courts, even though the Protocols have not been
ratified by the United States Senate.
This proposition is related to activities that have already infiltrated the
Supreme Court. Currently, an ongoing debate exists regarding the use of
international law as a basis for making decisions respecting domestic law
questions in United States courts. 20 7 Three main cases have demonstrated
this trend:" Atkins v. Viginia,209 Lawrence v. Texas,2 10 and Roper v. Simmons.211
In Atkins, the Court struck down laws allowing for the death penalty for the
mentally retarded.2 ' 2 Relying in part on the European Union's amicus brief,
the court stated that "within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is over-
whelmingly disapproved."' 3 The Lawrence Court overturned a Texas law
203 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
204 Id. at 732-33.
205 Id. at 733.
2o6 See Slavery, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery (last visited Feb. zz,
2oo6). As of November 2003, 104 nations agreed to ban slavery by ratifying the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which developed from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
207 Kochan, supra note 38, at 126.
zo8 See id.
209 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21o Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
211 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (zoo5).
212 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
213 Id. at 316.
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prohibiting homosexual sodomy.2 ' 4 Justice Kennedy, writing the majority
opinion, referring to an earlier case on sodomy in which a similar prohibi-
tion was upheld,15 stated that the Court's reasoning and holding have been
rejected by the European Court of Human Rights and that "other nations
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct." 126 Finally,
in Roper, the Court struck down the juvenile death penalty, again relying
on international consensus rather than established American history and
precedent3
7
In light of these trends, it is clear that the gatekeeper function of the
district courts carries much responsibility and broad latitude. Arguing from
the lesser to the greater, one might reasonably expect that if the Supreme
Court is willing to apply foreign law to domestic law cases, then it will be
even more likely that the Court will allow foreign law to be integral to cases
brought under the ATS, even if such foreign law disagrees with historically
recognized American law. For these reasons, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Sosa is not as narrow as it appears, and corporations can expect the ATS to
be a thorn in their corporate sides for many years to come.
214 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
215 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
216 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
217 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punish-
ment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not be-
come controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court's deci-
sion in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to
international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments."
(citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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